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I. Pricing and Goals 
 
The instrument of “price” can be applied in many different ways to museums. The price may 
be zero (no charge), be imposed or be voluntary (in which case it is a donation). The price is 
usually to be paid at the point of entry, but we argue that it may also be imposed when 
exiting. The price may be uniform or differentiated according to the length of the visit, the 
type of visitor, and the type of exhibition. Museum pricing may be used to reach a variety of 
different goals: 
 
1. Basic museum responsibilities 
In his “Museum Manifesto”, Noble (1970) describes the five basic responsibilities of every 
museum. In the following decades Noble’s five-part analysis has proven to be useful as an 
evaluation tool for the systematic assessment of a museum’s performance. These five basic 
goals are interrelated with each other as well as with the pricing applied by the museums 
(Merryman 1989): 
- Collection: The collection of cultural and natural objects dates back to the early stages 
of human society. Museums collect to extend, consolidate or complete existing 
collections. 
- Conservation: To preserve objects from deterioration certain measures such as 
prevention, conservation, restoration and appropriate treatment need to be taken. 
Pricing is a major factor to determine the number of visitors, which in turn influences 
the survival of the objects. Too many visitors deteriorate them. 
- Study: The scientific treatment involves compiling an inventory and establishing the 
proof of origin (“provenience”). Without this, the object can lose its value. 
- Exhibition: The objects are usually presented in permanent or special exhibitions. By 
exhibiting the museum presents its work to the public and fulfils its educational 
function. 
- Communication: There are various forms of communicating the artistic content, such 
as written captions, personal explanations or electronic tools. The different means are 
able to address different groups of visitors.1 
  
2. Economic aspects 
Pricing is one of the main determinants influencing the economic outcome of museums. Since 
most museums receive public support, their economic performance is of high interest for 
policy makers.  
- Efficiency: The scarce resources of a museum are to be allocated to produce as much 
utility as possible. This is the dominant, and in most cases, the only goal considered in 
standard neo-classical cultural economics. 
- Possibility for differentiation: As a means of price discrimination, specific groups of 
(potential) visitors, e.g. locals, can be treated differently than other visitors, e.g. 
foreign tourists. 
- Financial revenue: The museum has to raise sufficient revenue to cover its costs. In 
principle, this should also include all costs of capital, which for museums refer to the 
location (museums are often in locations of high economic value), the value of the 
collection, and the value of its buildings. Revenue does not only depend on the price 
charged but also on the income derived from the museum shop and restaurants, and 
the renting out of museum facilities. In a more extended way, the donations received 
from corporate sponsors and private patrons are also part of the revenue.  
                                                
1 Noble’s five goals were later condensed to preservation (as combination of collection and conservation), 
research and communication (which includes exhibition and communication) (Weil 1990).  
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- Profit: It is not usually the purpose of public museums to make profit. However, 
private museum might do so, especially private galleries selling the objects on display. 
- Donors: Museums are trying to attract donors who can give money or objects.  
- Museum as advertisement: In the case of a (fully) sponsored museum, the goal is to 
attract visitors and gather publicity in order to advertise in favor of the sponsors. 
- Spillover effects: Firms and other institutions other than the museum profit from the 
existence of the museum depending on how it charges its visitors.  
- Administrative cost: Museums may have been inherited from the past and 
governments keep them only because they already exist. They therefore want to run 
them at the lowest possible cost.  
 
3. Social or political aspects 
One main rationale for the public support of museums is the existence of positive external 
effects. Politicians or museum managers (Anderson 1998) often argue that free admission 
should be granted to attract less educated social groups; museums should not end up as 
‘elitist’ institutions.  
- Cultural involvement: Theoretical and empirical considerations suggest that cultural 
activities produce more extensive and important positive externalities than elsewhere 
(Peacock and Rizzo 1994). Pricing can induce groups of people, which rarely or never 
visit museums to do so more frequently and therefore extend the benefits of the 
external effects.  
- Social considerations: People with low income should be given the chance to have 
access to museums.  
- Education Value: Museums can foster creativity in general or can be designed to 
generate ideas for commercial activities (e.g. Victoria & Albert Museum, London). 
However, many of the educational benefits of having a national historical museum 
materialize only when the level of participation is high and evenly spread across 
socioeconomic groups (O'Hagan and Duffy 1995).  
- Number of visitors: Maximizing the number of visitors in order to increase reputation, 
gather publicity or attract donors can be achieved through pricing or staging popular 
exhibitions. 
- Prestige value: Prestige is generated by the museum for the nation, the region or the 
local community. Many of the best-known museums in the world such as the Prado, 
the Uffizi or the Louvre are national icons representing the splendor of their respective 
cultures and countries. 
- Generate attention: The museum management’s need to gain publicity can be satisfied 
by special or even shocking exhibitions. 
 
None of these goals can be pursued without affecting other goals. For instance, efficiency 
pricing with falling average costs leads to a financial loss, thus impacting the revenue goal. 
Some of these goals cannot be achieved by the market, even if price differentiation is applied. 
This constitutes one of the rationales for the public support of museums. The goals also differ 
from one museum to the other, depending on the ownership and funding: public, private, by 
donations or something in between (Frey and Meier 2006). The analysis and impact of pricing 
also depend on the degree of congestion of the museum and the existence of close substitute 
goods.  
 
This paper analyzes museum pricing taking into account the different objectives. In contrast, 
standard economics focuses on efficiency. The bulk of the literature on museum pricing 
analyzes the charging practice, considering only one or a limited number of museums 
(Anderson 1998; Bailey and Falconer 1998). Our approach studies the charging principles of 
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museums. Economists can contribute relatively little to the discussion of what the proper 
objectives of a museum are, so we do not weigh the goals. Further it is impossible to deal with 
all the varieties of pricing and the different goals in a limited space. We therefore restrict our 
attention to free entry, which has been extensively discussed in literature and can be 
supplemented by exit donations (section II). The traditional efficiency approach to museum 
pricing from the point of view of the other goals is also discussed and extended to the 
museum clubs (section III). A largely disregarded property of efficient price discrimination is 
its rejection by most visitors due to fairness considerations (section IV). In the following 
section we propose a new variant of pricing exit prices, which partly overcomes the 
disadvantages of other pricing schemes (section V). Conclusions are drawn in section VI.  
 
 
II. Free Entry Reconsidered 
 
There is extensive literature debating the merits and demerits of granting free entry to 
museums (O'Hagan 1995; Anderson 1998; Bailey and Falconer 1998). Some countries such 
as the United Kingdom with its national museums (e.g. the National Gallery or the British 
Museum in London) follow this policy. If the term “museum” is understood in a broader 
sense to include World Heritage sights (Frey and Pamini 2009; 2010) this policy is even more 
common. Free entry is granted into World Heritage cities such as Florence, Bern, Bruges or 
Venice. The latter could quite easily impose an entry fee but in fact it does not, even though 
on an average day no less than 39,000 people visit and overcrowd this island and its severely 
restricted space. Other World Heritage sites like the Machu Picchu have an entry fee but it is 
so low that it is badly overcrowded and the ruins are quickly deteriorating.2 
Generally, free access has gained quite some popularity recently. People have experienced 
open access in important areas of their life, in particular the Internet3, for instance by 
downloading songs and films or using open source software (Osterloh et al. 2002). They have 
also experienced how goods which in the past had to be bought are now offered free of 
charge. Examples are freely distributed newspapers, or buses in city centers (as, for example, 
in Perth, Australia).  
There are some important advantages of free access to museums. An important one is that it is 
considered to be “social” as poorer people do not have to pay a price (nor do richer people, 
but this is, somehow surprisingly, not considered to be unfair). It may also help draw new 
groups into the cultural experience of museum visits, though this is doubtful (O'Hagan and 
Duffy 1995; O'Hagan 1995). Empirical evidence suggests that people who visit museums 
come predominantly from higher social classes (Maddison and Foster 2003; Lampi and Orth 
2009). As a consequence, free entry is in favor of the rich and hardly transfers welfare to 
poorer people. It seems difficult to argue in favor of free entry and subsidizing museums for 
distributional reasons. 
Another advantage is that free entry raises the number of visitors, which may be seen as a sign 
of increased cultural prestige for the museum. The cost of administration may also be 
somewhat lower. Finally, an important aspect is that donors prefer non-profit firms, where the 
possibility that the managers of the firm exploit donors and consumers is limited. The higher 
the admission charge is, the lesser donors may be willing to give money or objects. With zero 
admission, they have a higher incentive to make donations (O'Hagan 1998; Frey and Meier 
2006). 
 
 
                                                
2 http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15501877 
3 The economic situation is different, however, because access to the Internet in most cases is a public good not 
causing any additional costs – assuming additional users do not decrease the speed for other users. 
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Free entry is sometimes justified with the efficiency argument that the marginal costs of an 
additional visitor are zero. In this case, admission charges should be zero to satisfy efficiency. 
However, there is a general consensus within the cultural economics literature that the costs 
of museum services are inadequately reported (Bailey and Falconer 1998). There are the usual 
problems of determining long run and short run marginal costs. Moreover, museums and 
galleries usually do not measure the opportunity costs of their collections and do not include 
the value of their collections in their accounts. It is widely agreed that fees are insufficient to 
cover full costs, for example, visitors may receive a subsidy even when a charge is levied. 
The assumption of zero marginal cost can be doubted for various reasons: Only in the short 
run the marginal cost of an additional visitors to institutions operating below full capacity is 
zero. Long run marginal cost is positive due to the costs of allowing visitors into a museum 
(security, heating, lighting and physical space). But even in the short run there could be 
positive marginal cost, e.g. the space that could be used for other purposes such as 
conservation. In highly visited museums congestions costs might be significant. 
 
Providing free entry has several major disadvantages. Efficiency is not attained if the 
respective museums are sometimes overcrowded and the quality of a visit diminishes. As a 
consequence, some museums resort to administrative entry restrictions, which benefit people 
belonging to an organized group. Da Vinci’s Last Supper in Santa Maria delle Grazie in 
Milan, for instance, offers free entry for certain visitor groups, but only allows visitors who 
made a reservation considerable time in advance. It is thus not possible for an individual 
tourist visiting Milan to see this major painting except if he or she has taken the necessary 
steps ahead of the visit. Another example, where all visitors enjoy free access is the Santa 
Sindone (Holy Shroud), which is displayed this year in the Duomo di San Giovanni in Turino. 
There is always the danger that entry tickets are reserved and then sold on the black market. 
In that case, the entry is costly for the visitor but at the same time the museum does not get 
any revenue. Free entry does not necessarily raise the involvement of people normally far 
from cultural activities and does not allow any differentiation between local visitors and 
tourists. Empirical evidence suggests that the entry price level does not affect visits by this 
group much (Bailey and Falconer 1998). Even if there is no charge the opportunity cost of 
visiting a museum can be too high, depending on individual preferences. They may also think 
that “something which has no price has no value”. The total revenue of a museum decreases 
by giving free access. Steiner (1997) estimates the impact of an additional free day on a 
museum’s total revenue. Also including cross price elasticities of shop and restaurant sales, 
she shows that an additional free day is not profitable for the museum. The number of 
additional visitors that a museum attracts by free entry is not enough to offset the loss of 
admission receipts. Finally, the overcrowding caused by free entry contributes to the 
deterioration of the objects collected. 
Museum directors are usually in favor of free access (Anderson 1998). They follow rational 
considerations to maximize their benefit. Setting up a theoretical principal-agent model for 
museum administration, Prieto-Rodríguez et al. (2006) define two income sources for a 
museum: public grants and tickets revenues. The model defines the optimal contract for 
museum managers considering public grants, ticket prices, budget and managerial effort. 
Besides theoretically confirming the low price elasticities found in empirical studies they 
show that museum managers should not have control over the price of tickets in order to 
induce optimal managerial effort. This is supported by an empirical study by Maddison 
(2004) who finds that increasing non-grant income produces an equivalent reduction in 
government grants. A reduction in government grants and a raise in revenue through 
admissions result in a much higher effort for the museum managers. 
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Exit donations 
Almost all museums, even those with free entry, ask for a voluntary contribution at the end of 
the visit and half of them impose charges for special or temporary exhibitions (Bailey 1994b). 
In order to increase revenue it is important to confront the visitors with this option. There are 
different possibilities for suggesting a donation: Either the museum allows for free donations 
or suggests a range or level of donation, or it could insist on some payment, but leave the 
level of payment to the visitor. A main advantage of donations is that they attempt to capture 
payments according to willingness and ability to pay (O'Hagan 1995). 
A voluntary exit donation may be instituted in hopes that visitors, having enjoyed their visit, 
are willing to make a generous donation to the museum. A classical homo oeconomicus 
would anyway give nothing. He or she has already profited from the museum and is unwilling 
to give a present at the end. Extensive empirical research by laboratory experiments and in the 
field suggests that most people do not behave this way (Frey and Meier 2003; Meier and 
Stutzer 2007). They are prepared to donate what they consider to be fair. The more satisfied 
they were with the museum the more they are prepared to spend. It can therefore be predicted 
that an exit donation will not undermine museum revenue. Visitors have more choice 
available and this increases their satisfaction, inducing them to spend more in the museum 
shop and restaurant. The arrangement can be considered social and may effectively increase 
the involvement of people otherwise not visiting museums (compared to fixed entry prices). 
The administration is simple but it is important to have a friendly staff. To ask for an exit 
donation may raise a museum’s international, regional and local prestige as it shows a 
measure of sovereignty. 
As the donation is voluntary, it does not act as a rationing device and therefore lead to 
inefficiently high numbers of visitors, overusing the museum. However, it is more efficient 
than free entry and produces more financial resources for the museum. 
 
 
III. Entry Charge 
 
Cultural economics based on neoclassical economics looks at museums as if it were a firm. 
Following standard welfare analysis, the goal is to allocate the resources as efficiently as 
possible, i.e. to maximize the net utility produced for society. The (potential) visitors have to 
be charged a price such that marginal utility equals marginal cost, or such that the demand for 
visiting the museum equals supply, normally given by a fixed capacity of persons able to visit 
the museum.  
To achieve this goal is not easy because the utility of a visit (or the willingness to pay) 
depends on the number of visitors. The quality of a visit deteriorates when too many people 
want to see the objects.4 Overcrowding results in queuing, noise and even in an inability to 
see the objects on display. Empirical evidence suggests that congestion costs can be 
significant. Using valuation techniques Maddison (2003) estimates the congestion cost posed 
by the marginal visitors to the British Museum to be as high as £8.05. As the demand for 
visiting a museum varies, price differentiation is efficient when: 
- Demand is low and far from full capacity and the price should be close to zero as 
additional visitors produce very little additional resource costs. In contrast, when more 
people than capacity allows want to visit the museum, the price must be raised to 
ration demand. This guarantees that those individuals with the highest willingness to 
pay are able to enjoy the museum.  
                                                
4 The relationship between quantity and quality has not to be uniformly negative. Many people do not enjoy to 
being in an empty museum, so that in that range more visitors increase the utility of the other visitors. 
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- People with a low price elasticity of demand are to be charged higher prices than those 
with a high elasticity of demand. The former refrain to a larger extent from visiting a 
museum when confronted with a higher price. Having two separate entry points into 
the museum can approximate this differentiation: one with a higher price and a shorter 
waiting queue, another with a lower price and a longer queue.  
- Price can be differentiated according to whether people want to visit a special 
exhibition (where demand is likely to be higher and therefore price should be higher) 
and the normal collection, to be priced lower.  
 
Another goal may be to charge lower prices for local residents and to charge foreign visitors 
with higher prices since they do not contribute to the funding of the museum by paying taxes. 
This is often done for ski lifts, public swimming pools and also for cultural venues. It is 
usually compatible with efficiency pricing as tourists have a lower price elasticity of demand 
and should therefore be charged more. When tourists are in a town with a famous museum 
(such as Los Angeles and the Getty), visiting the museum is a “must”. It is then efficient to 
charge tourists a higher price as they visit the museum even if the price is much higher than 
what locals are prepared to pay. In this case, there is no conflict between the goals of 
efficiency and cultural involvement of the local population.  
Admission charges can be considered reasonable as those who visit a museum are those who 
derive the most benefit from it, given that a benefit-related tax cannot be implemented. Their 
contribution through general taxation should be complemented by an admission charge. 
Visitors derive an extra benefit from going to a museum in addition to e.g. the existence value 
and should pay for these extra benefits. 
The price elasticity for cultural demand normally is estimated to be rather low. Felton (1992) 
shows that for subscriber attendance of operas ticket prices have a negative influence on 
demand for opera tickets only if the prices of these tickets reach a very high level. Thus, 
Felton assumes that ticket prices are not the best explanation for demand, and that the often 
presumed ceteris paribus premise is not realistic. Throsby (1982) finds that quality 
characteristics have a much higher influence on demand than price. Luksetich and Partridge 
(1997) also focus on the trade-off between the revenue-enhancing nature of charging or 
increasing admission fees versus likely decreases in attendance resulting from higher prices. 
Their major finding is that museum price elasticity is very inelastic (-0.25). A museum facing 
financial difficulties can therefore generate significant increases in revenue by raising their 
admission fee. Moreover, while introducing charges reduces the number of visits, it might 
well be that this is compensated by the duration of the visits.5 
Two frequent suggestions made in literature are to levy an admission charge only for extra 
services or to use the revenue created to make the museum more attractive. Where the 
additional revenues raised by charges are used to improve the standard of service, the number 
of visitors tends to increase. O’Hagan (1995) finds no negative effect on the introduction of 
admission charge on attendance, but rather the contrary. By introducing admission charges the 
Long Room of Trinity College Dublin made several service improvement for visitors. 
However, there have also been more overseas visitors in Dublin in general with low price 
elasticity. Furthermore, if there is no close substitute to a museum, consumers have a 
relatively low price elasticity of demand for attendance. 
Quality is an important determinant of cultural demand. People show a willingness to pay a 
price above the actual admission fee if the quality of exhibition is high (Institut für 
                                                
5 There are also studies that find a stronger impact of charging on attendance. The AEA management consultants 
calculated that, by introducing an admission charge (depending on the pricing scheme) the British National 
Museums attendance would drop between one quarter and one third. Museums, which initially charged, but then 
removed the fees were able to increase the numbers of visitors significantly. E.g. in the Art Gallery of Victoria in 
Melbourne the number of visitors rose from 600.000 to more than one million (Anderson 1998). 
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Museumskunde 1996). Admission charges can also be used to promote access, if one assumes 
net additionally. In this case revenue from charges is an additional income for the museum 
provided that other funds are not shortened. This may finance increased access in cases where 
museums no longer have to cut costs by reducing opening hours or where those revenues 
finance ‘outreach’ programs. These suggestions are supported by the findings of Kolb (1997). 
The general assumption that young people do not attend cultural events (in this case 
performing arts) because ticket prices are too high is contradicted. The major barrier for 
students is not cost, but the concern that art events are boring.  
 
The great advantage of pricing according to neoclassical principles is that it produces an 
efficient allocation of the scarce resources of museums – at least up to a point. Efficiency is 
only local. Due to falling average costs, which result from high fixed costs being distributed 
to a larger number of visitors, marginal cost and price are below average, resulting in a 
deficit. If the dead weight loss of financing this deficit is large, the situation may no longer be 
overall efficient. The deficits produced by museums are generally only a minute part of the 
overall public budget so that the additional deadweight loss can be assumed to be minor. An 
additional advantage of the traditional approach to pricing is that the cost includes the 
deterioration in the quality of the objects due to large numbers of visitors.  
The efficiency approach is confronted with various problems. It does not consider 
distributional aspects. Moreover, it does not consider the goal of attracting new groups to the 
cultural experience of visiting museums. Neither does it consider the benefits of spillover 
effects outside the museum or national, regional or local prestige effects. However, since 
consumers show a low price elasticity for cultural demand, the negative effect of raising the 
admission price tends to be small. If the revenue created by admission charges is used to 
improve quality or provide extra services it is even possible to attract a larger audience. 
 
Museum Clubs 
A variant of charging entry fees is the club solution. It consists in asking a fixed contribution 
to become a member of the club giving the right to visit the museum. As a rule, club members 
enjoy free entry. In this case, the advantages and disadvantages are the same as those of free 
entry, except that the club contribution raises revenue.6  
The club solution can have several dimensions and be connected with price discrimination. 
The contribution may differ according to whether the people are locals, or tourists (who in 
most cases are not club members), according to income (in which case the social goals are 
better fulfilled), according to the estimated price elasticity of demand, or according to whether 
price varies with respect to how far the capacity of the museum is used. The club solution can 
therefore approximate efficient pricing to a high degree and can at the same time take account 
for other goals.  
The club solution is, however, not conducive to raising the involvement of people who rarely 
or never visit museums. Indeed, culturally aware people use the membership to a museum 
club to signal to others their attachment to culture. In contrast, people far from culture will not 
do so. But museum clubs provide a possibility to involve such people. Museum club 
membership can be given free of charge to groups of the population traditionally distant from 
culture. The recipients of the certificate showing they are now members of the museum club – 
for which others have to pay – may establish a relationship with the museum, and may even 
fill them with pride. They have an incentive to exploit the possibility to visit “their” museum 
free of charge. If they opt not to visit the museum, they don’t have to pay anything. This 
                                                
6 There are a variety of different clubs at the federal or local level for a network of museums or single museums 
in Switzerland, among others CH Museumspass, Zürcher Museumspass, Conseil International des Musées, 
Verband der Museen der Schweiz, Mitglieder Gesellschaft für das Schweizerische Landesmuseum, Mitglieder 
Association des Amis du Château de Prangins. 
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makes such a solution attractive though there is, of course, a conflict with the goal of 
collecting financial revenue.  
Membership schemes or annual passes also encourage repeat visits. Once the membership is 
paid, entrance is free. So if the annual (or life) membership fee is kept reasonably low the fee 
does not deter access (Bailey and Falconer 1998). 
 
 
IV. Evaluations of Pricing as Rationing Device  
 
While price differentiations according to elasticities or as a rationing device do contribute to 
efficiency, they are still surprisingly little used. The most important reason is that visitors 
reject many forms of pricing, an aspect disregarded by standard neoclassical economics. They 
do, for instance, not see why a person with low income should not be able to visit a museum, 
while richer individuals are easily able to pay a (high) entry price. But the rejection of pricing 
is not only related to income considerations. It has been demonstrated that people in some 
cases reject the price system as a rationing device and prefer an allocation by tradition or by 
administrative fiat (Kahneman et al. 1986; Frey and Pommerehne 1993; Frey 2001). There are 
various reasons why the majority of people reject the price system: 
1. Lack of information: Non-economists are often not sufficiently aware of the forceful 
properties of pricing for resource allocation. The basic mechanism of the “invisible 
hand” is not widely understood and the transfer of modern economic knowledge to the 
general public has not been undertaken successfully. This lack of economic 
knowledge is sometimes willingly chosen. For non-economists like lawyers, 
politicians or museum directors adapting to the economic theory would result in a loss 
of educational capital acquired in their field of education. To accept that the price 
system is in most cases best suited to achieve a goal constitutes a loss, which people 
try to avoid by focusing on their comparative advantage. 
2. Conflict over income distribution: Interest groups, who expect to lose in the 
distributional struggle, block the use of price. Even if the price system is known to 
work efficiently, it is rejected. Distributional concerns could be overcome if costless 
compensation was possible. However, costless redistribution is not usually possible 
and therefore political aspects and government intervention prevail (Frey 1999). 
Modern political economy shows that the reason for government intervention is not 
market failure, but the struggle over income distribution (Buchanan 1980). As a 
consequence, issues are discussed in terms of distribution or prospective losses often 
affecting only a small section of the population. In the case of museums free entry is 
usually proposed by higher socio-economic classes, which benefit from it the most.  
3. Pricing is considered unfair: Empirical evidence shows that the use of prices is not 
welcomed by a large share of the population in circumstances where most economists 
would recommend its use. In a well-defined excess demand situation, more than three-
quarters of the population consider it unfair to allocate the scarce resources via a price 
increase (Kahneman et al. 1986; Frey and Pommerehne 1993). However, the fairness 
of pricing must be analyzed in a comparative perspective; no decision-making system 
is completely fair or unfair. What matters is how prices perform in comparison with 
their alternatives. With a traditional procedure, a fixed rule (e.g. first come, first 
served) is applied irrespective of excess demand. While this scheme is often applied 
(also in museums), it does not seem a priori to be particularly fair. A second 
mechanism is random allocation. While one important criterion of “fairness” is met, 
namely each person is treated equally, it does not take into consideration the “need” of 
a person. A third procedure is distribution by a selected group of people. The most 
important of such groups is the government, which is bound by democratic rules and 
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allocates the resources according to administrative principles. The economic theory of 
bureaucracy points to many different systematic biases inherent in administrative 
decision making, so the resulting allocation is not expected to be efficient or fair 
(Breton and Wintrobe 1982). None of these four mechanisms can be a priori expected 
to be fair when dealing with excess demand,. While economists argue that the pricing 
system is more just, empirical evidence shows that consumers consider tradition and 
administration to be more fair (Frey 1999). 
The subjective evaluation of fairness depends on whether the situation of excess 
demand is unique and unpredictable or recurrent and to be expected. In the first case 
supply is given and must be cleared by a rationing device. If the situation occurs often, 
suppliers are expected to adjust. Prices are considered particularly unfair in situations 
where they serve to ration demand, compared to when they serve as a decision-making 
system. This implies that there is less aversion to pricing when it may be expected that 
it strongly increases supply. In a museum, which is confronted by excess demand and 
congestion, supply can be raised by extending opening hours.  
 
Museum directorates take this perception into account and refrain from using extensive price 
variations. These reasons often seem to reflect a gut feeling of the museum community and 
public administration rather than any deeper reason. However, almost every museum has 
some type of price differentiation. Often, only a minority of visitors pays the full admission 
fee. There are discounts for (in diminishing order of frequency) children, elderly, family 
groups, students, unemployed, disabled, groups of adults, members or “friends” of the 
museum and local residents (Bailey 1994a). These discounts often do not correspond to 
efficiency considerations, e.g. senior people have, on average, a lower price elasticity of 
demand to visit museums and should therefore be charged a higher efficient price. 
 
 
V. Exit Price 
 
Considering the significant negative aspects of free entry and efficiency pricing, we want to 
propose a new pricing mechanism for museums: the application of exit prices. Instead of 
charging visitors when they enter the museum, they are charged when they leave it. The 
longer time is spent in the museum, the higher is the exit price.  
Surprisingly, this pricing mechanism has not been considered in the debate about museum 
admission fees so far. This “art per minute” is similar to the costs of putting a car into a 
parking garage and then paying at the exit, according to the length of time the facility has 
been used. There are also similar pricing schemes for e.g. swimming halls or saunas. Exit 
prices should be indicated at the point of entry so that the visitors may adjust. For instance, it 
may indicate that a hour-long visit costs 10 Euros, and one of two hours 15 Euros. Of course 
the price does not have to be calculated discretely; it can also be calculated continuously, e.g. 
per minute. Marginal admission rates (the price a visitor has to pay for one minute) can be 
constant or decrease with time. Decreasing rates would induce a longer visit, since average 
cost per minute are decreasing. Also price discrimination is possible. One goal could be to 
increase efficiency by charging for example tourists or elderly people with a lower elasticity 
of demand a higher rate per minute. One can also consider fairness arguments, such as  
charging a lower rate for unemployed visitors. 
The classical homo oeconomicus of neoclassical theory would optimize the intake of culture 
per minute to balance the pro rata price of exit. This may be considered a disadvantage. The 
length of the museum visit becomes even more part of an economic calculus than it already is. 
In contrast to entry prices the individual only has to calculate the opportunity cost of his or 
her time as the price does not depend on how long the visit is.  
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Exit prices have the major advantage that they take into account how satisfied the visitors 
were with the museum. One critical but usually disregarded characteristic of a museum is that 
the visit is an experience good. An experience good is a product or service where the product 
characteristics such as quality is difficult to observe in advance, but these characteristics can 
only be ascertained upon consumption (Nelson 1970). Experience goods pose difficulties for 
consumers in accurately making consumption choices. This characteristic can justify charging 
the visitors of a museum when they leave. Efficiency is raised because visitors pay according 
to their use of the facility. Compared to an entry price they have an additional margin to 
adjust according to their preferences, which is due to raise their utility. One of the basic tenets 
of welfare theory is that individuals gain when their opportunity set is larger (Frey 1999). 
Those whose utility increases when they choose a bundle of goods in the enlarged set 
(museum visitors who can adjust the time and money they spend) are better off, while all the 
others do not lose anything (the ones who do not visit museums). 
As a side effect of being more satisfied, visitors may be willing to spend more money at the 
museum shop and restaurant. Moreover, the price system is considered to be less unfair than 
an entry price. Those staying longer have profited more and may find it fair to pay more than 
somebody staying only for a short period. Exit charges lead to greater involvement of people 
otherwise far from culture, if a certain amount of time at the beginning of the visit is free of 
charge. When, for example, the first 20 minutes are free, they can leave the museum without 
paying if they did not enjoy it. With entry prices, the cost must be paid at the very beginning 
and it may demotivate them (Kirchberg 1998). The scheme is not difficult from the 
administrative point of view as pricing can easily be done by machines. Furthermore, its 
introduction may be a good advertisement for the museum due to the media coverage of the 
innovative pricing scheme. Whether exit prices increase revenue, and whether they help to 
preserve the objects on display depends on how they are fixed, and cannot be evaluated in 
general.  
A possible extension of the exit price mechanism is a refund at the end of the visit. In this 
case visitors buy their ticket at the entrance, but if they stay less than a certain amount of time 
they get their money back according to how much less time they spent in the museum. This 
variation is analogous to ski resorts, where visitors get a refund if they use their daily pass 
only for some hours. The positive aspects are basically the same as for exit prices; visitors pay 
according to their satisfaction. However, since visitors have already paid at the entrance the 
incentive to rush is mitigated. 
 
 
VI. Conclusions 
 
Museums have many different goals to fulfill, not simply efficiency as assumed in neo-
classical economics. Important additional goals are social equity, the involvement of groups 
otherwise far from culture, financial revenue, spillover effects on other institutions, 
conservation of the objects collected, administrative simplicity and international, regional and 
local prestige of the museum.  
Various pricing schemes have been discussed. The classical ones are free entry and efficiency 
entry prices. Both have significant advantages and disadvantages. Free entry has the potential 
to attract more visitors, but since museum visitors come mainly from higher socio-economic 
classes, waiving the fee results in an undesired redistribution from lower to higher income 
classes. The existence of positive external effects of museum visits supports free entry. 
However, the benefit for visitors is higher than for non-visitors. Short run marginal cost above 
zero and a low price elasticity of cultural demand also help levy some kind of admission 
charge. Standard pricing fulfills efficiency criteria, but it was argued that people are opposed 
to the use of the price system to ration demand. The price system is considered to be unfair, 
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because it does not take into account distributional aspects and the actual ‘need’ of 
consumers. The museum club solution offers some attractive advantages to efficiency pricing 
and free entry as it offers more flexibility to take various goals into account, in particular 
involving people otherwise rarely or never visiting museums.  
This paper proposes a novel approach, which has not been considered in the museum pricing 
debate so far: The use of exit prices. They also have some disadvantages. People might be 
induced to rush through the exhibition, but such behavior can be mitigated by charging a 
marginally decreasing exit price per unit of time. Exit prices have a number of notable 
advantages. The most important is the increased choice available to visitors, which raises their 
satisfaction. Since a museum is an experience good it is difficult for consumers to make 
accurate consumption choices in advance. Efficiency is raised because the visitors pay 
depending on their use of the facility. Exit prices may also be considered as more fair 
compared to efficiency pricing because people can adjust their payment according to their 
needs. When evaluating the impact of different pricing schemes, it has to be considered that 
there are also other barriers to access, such as inflexible opening hours, unimaginative 
presentation and traveling costs. Exit prices are only one example of an innovation in museum 
prices. It would be interesting to see other alternatives to classical entry pricing, or to free 
access.   
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